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Abstract
When the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates binds, monetary policy cannot provide ap-
propriate stimulus. We show that in the standard New Keynesian model, tax policy can deliver such
stimulus at no cost and in a time-consistent manner. There is no need to use ine¢ cient policies such
as wasteful public spending or future commitments to in￿ ate. We conclude that in the New Keynesian
model, the zero bound on nominal interest rates is not a relevant constraint on both ￿scal and monetary
policy.
Key words: Zero Bound; Fiscal policy; Monetary policy; Sticky prices.
JEL classi￿cation: E31; E40; E52; E58; E62; E63.
￿Correia: Banco de Portugal, Universidade Catolica Portuguesa and CEPR. Farhi: Harvard University. Nicolini: FRB of
Minneapolis and Universidad Di Tella. Teles: Banco de Portugal, Universidade Catolica Portuguesa and CEPR. This paper
circulated with the title Policy at the Zero Bound. We thank Fernando Alvarez, Pierpaolo Benigno, Javier Garcia-Cicco, Patrick
Kehoe, Narayana Kocherlakota, John Leahy, Kjetil Storesletten, Sam Schulhofer-Wohl, Harald Uhlig, Tao Zha, participants at
the 8th Hydra Workshop, and at seminars at the University of Chicago, Princeton U., U.C. San Diego, Bank of Spain, the
Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta, Chicago, Minneapolis and St Louis, and the Board of Governors. Correia and Teles gratefully
acknowledge ￿nancial support of FCT.
11 Introduction
Arbitrage between money and bonds restricts nominal interest rates from becoming negative. One could
imagine circumstances in which, in the event of a potential recession, it is desirable for the Central Bank to
lower the policy rate. If the interest rate is very close to zero to begin with, the constraint may be binding.
This is the "zero bound" problem of monetary policy.
But, is there a zero bound problem when policy is more generally considered to include both ￿scal and
monetary instruments? Is ￿scal policy able to avoid a downturn when the zero bound constraint binds? In
this paper we show that the zero bound on nominal interest rates is not a relevant constraint on both ￿scal
and monetary policy. If the nominal interest rate is zero, taxes can play the role that the nominal interest
rate would play, could it be used without restrictions.
Considerable attention has been placed on this issue in recent times, following the outbreak of the 2008
and 2009 ￿nancial crisis. Nominal interest rates have indeed been very close to zero in the US, the EMU,
the UK and other countries. Given the restrictions on monetary policy, attention has shifted to alternative
policies. There has been work on public spending multipliers, showing that these can be very large at the
zero bound (see Christiano, Eichenbaum, Rebelo (2009), Eggertsson (2009), Woodford (2010), Mertens and
Ravn (2010)1). Eggertsson (2009) also considers di⁄erent alternative taxes and assesses which one is the
most desirable to deal with the zero bound. The zero bound is also a key component in the numerical
work presented in the evaluation of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan by Romer and Bernstein
(2009). It is also a main concern in Blanchard, Dell￿ Ariccia and Mauro (2010) who argue for a better
integration between monetary and ￿scal policy.
There is also earlier work on the implications of the zero bound for monetary and ￿scal policy, motivated
by the prolonged recession in Japan where overnight rates have been every close to zero for the last ￿fteen
years, as well as by the low targets for the Fed funds rate in the US in 2003 and 2004.2 Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003 and 2004a) show that there may be downturns that could, and should, be avoided if it was
not for the zero bound. They also show how monetary policy can be adjusted so that the costs of those
downturns may be reduced. In particular they propose policies that keep the interest rate for a longer period
at zero in order to generate in￿ ation. Eggertsson and Woodford (2004b) consider both monetary and ￿scal
policy in a Ramsey taxation model with consumption taxes only.3 All this work is done in the context of
standard sticky price models, where the zero bound on interest rates can be a serious challenge to policy.
That is indeed the general conclusion, justifying the use of ine¢ cient policies, such as wasteful government
spending, leading to undesirable in￿ ation.
With a di⁄erent, more general focus, Correia, Nicolini, and Teles (2008) show that ￿scal policy can be
1Mertens and Ravn show that multipliers can be low if the economy is close to an alternative, liquidity trap, steady state.
2In 2003 and 2004, the Fed funds rate fell down to 1%, and remained there for more than year.
3They also consider the case of two consumption taxes, such that prices are set after one and before the other. In that case
it would be possible to implement the same allocation, as if the zero bound did not bind. They ￿nd those taxes to be highly
unrealistic and move on to analyze the case of a single consumption tax.
2used to neutralize the e⁄ects of price stickiness. They consider an optimal Ramsey taxation model without
capital and with a monetary distortion, similar to the one in Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari, Christiano
and Kehoe (1991), but with sticky prices. They show that under sticky prices it is possible to implement
the same allocations as under ￿ exible prices, and that it is optimal to do so. Since the zero bound is the
optimal policy under ￿ exible prices, it must also be the optimal one under sticky prices. In this sense, the
zero bound is not a constraint to policy. These results and the pressing relevance of the policy question were
the motivation for this work.
In this paper, we take the standard set up analyzed by most of the zero bound literature, allow for capital
accumulation, and consider labor income, consumption, and capital income taxes. We show that whatever
policy can do with the nominal interest rate can also be done with a combination of those three taxes.
Furthermore, there is no equivalent restriction to the zero bound on nominal interest rates, when policy uses
taxes rather than interest rates. We conclude that, when ￿scal policy is used, the zero bound on nominal
interest rates does not restrict the set of implementable allocations. In the simple New Keynesian model, as
in Eggertsson (2009), it is possible to achieve the ￿rst best allocation if the zero bound does not bind, or,
alternatively, if taxes are used. This is an extreme result. In more general set ups, full e¢ ciency cannot be
attained. It is still the case, though, that the zero bound is irrelevant for both ￿scal and monetary policy.
We show this by considering an extension of the model where productivity shocks are ￿rm speci￿c or the
initial distribution of prices across ￿rms is non-degenerate.4
Suppose real rates ought to be negative. Since the nominal interest rate cannot be negative, the only
way to achieve negative real interest rates is to generate in￿ ation. This is precisely what the commitment
to low future interest rates ￿rst suggested in Krugman (1998) achieves in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003
and 2004a). But producer price in￿ ation is costly. Indeed, in the New Keynesian, sticky price, literature,
price setting decisions are staggered. Producer price in￿ ation then necessarily leads to dispersion in relative
prices￿ a real economic distortion. Is it possible to achieve negative real interest rates without incurring
this economic cost? We show that the answer to this question is a¢ rmative if ￿ exible tax instruments are
available.
The intuition why tax policy can neutralize the e⁄ects of the zero bound constraint is simple. It turns out
that the prices that matter for intertemporal decisions are consumer prices, which are gross of consumption
taxes. The idea is to induce in￿ ation in consumer prices, while keeping producer price in￿ ation at zero. The
result is negative real interest rates, and the distortions associated with producer price in￿ ation are altogether
avoided. This can be achieved by simultaneously adjusting consumption and labor taxes. Imagine ￿rst that
producer price in￿ ation is zero. Then a temporarily lower consumption tax generates in￿ ation in consumer
prices. The problem is that this change in consumption taxes introduces undesirable variations in the
marginal cost of ￿rms over time: a lower consumption tax reduces the marginal cost of ￿rms. It also creates
incentives for producers to reduce their prices. This e⁄ect must therefore be counteracted by temporarily
4Yun (2005) analyzes optimal monetary policy when the initial distribution of prices is non-degenerate.
3raising the labor tax. Overall, this policy acts as a costless tax on money.5 It essentially achieves a negative
nominal interest rate in the consumer price numeraire.
In a model with capital, this policy must be supplemented with a temporary capital subsidy. This is
because a path of consumption taxes which increases over time acts as a tax on capital. This tax on capital
is undesirable and must be counteracted with a corresponding subsidy. The goal is to tax money, not capital.
Importantly, because our policy implements the e¢ cient allocation, it is time-consistent: if a future
planner were given an opportunity to revise this policy in the future, it would choose not to do so. This
should be contrasted with the policy recommendations involving future commitments to low interest rates
in Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003 and 2004a).
Our policy recommendation requires ￿ exibility of taxes. It has been argued that ￿scal instruments are
not as ￿ exible as monetary policy instruments. Whether this argument applies to stabilization policy during
a "great moderation" period could be argued about. However, it certainly does not apply to exceptional
circumstances such as the recent crisis or the Japanese stagnation in the nineties, precisely because the need
to use ￿scal instruments is exceptional. There have been recent policy proposals in this direction by Robert
Hall and Susan Woodward6, and earlier on, by Feldstein (2003), intended at Japan.7 Both of them suggested
lowering consumption taxes as a way to ￿ght the crisis. Our model formalizes these proposals and highlights
the way other taxes must be jointly used.
The paper proceeds as follows: We ￿rst describe the model, in section 2. In section 3, we characterize the
￿rst best allocation and show how it can be implemented, away from the zero bound using interest rate policy,
and at the zero bound using tax policy. We consider the linearized model in section 4, so that the relation
with the literature can be made more clear. We consider a model with capital in section 5. In section 6, we
show that the results can be generalized to environments where it is not optimal (or feasible) to replicate
￿ exible prices. In a model with ￿rm speci￿c productivity shocks and/or a non-degenerate distribution of
initial prices, it is still the case that the zero bound constraint on nominal interest rates can be overcome
using tax policy.
2 The Model
The model we analyze is a standard new-Keynesian model, similar to the one analyzed by Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003) and (2004b), and Eggertsson (2009). As it has become standard in the New Keynesian
5In conformity with the New Keynesian literature, we consider cashless economies. We therefore ignore the costs of in￿ation
associated with the in￿ation tax resulting from deviations from the Friedman rule.
6An article by Justin Lahart in the Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2009, "State Sales-Tax Cuts: Get Another Look",
comments on the proposals of Hall and Woodward in their blog. See also the speech by Narayana Kocherlakota, President of
the Minneapolis Fed, "Monetary Policy Actions and Fiscal Policy Substitutes," November 18, 2010.
7"The Japanese government could announce that it will raise the current 5 percent value added tax by 1 percent per quarter
and simultaneously reduce the income tax rates to keep revenue unchanged, continuing this for several years until the VAT
reaches 20 percent." Feldstein (2003).
4literature, the economy is cashless.
The uncertainty in period t ￿ 0 is described by the random variable st 2 St, where St is the set of
possible events at t, and the history of its realizations up to period t is denoted by st 2 St. For simplicity
we index by t the variables that are functions of st.
















, ￿ > 1; (2)
where cit is private consumption of variety i 2 [0;1], Nt is total labor, and ￿t is a preference shock.
Aggregate government consumption Gt is exogenous. It is also a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of public











The production function of each good i, uses labor, nit; according to
cit + git = Aitnit; (4)






The government minimizes the expenditure on the individual goods, for a given aggregate, and ￿nances it with
time varying taxes on consumption, ￿c
t, and labor income, ￿n
t . As is standard in the new-Keynesian literature,




































t + EtQt;t+1Bt;t+1 = B
h
t￿1 + Bh





￿t ￿ (1 + ￿c
t)PtCt ￿ Tt
together with a no-Ponzi games condition. Bt;t+1 represent the quantity of state contingent bonds that
pay one unit of money at time t+1; in state st+1 and B
h
t are risk free nominal bonds. Qt;t+1 is the price of
the state contingent bond, normalized by the probability of occurrence of the state at t + 1, and 1
1+it is the
price of the riskless bond￿ so 1 + it is the gross nominal interest rate. Wt is the nominal wage and ￿t are
pro￿ts. We assume that pro￿ts are fully taxed, ￿d = 1.8
The ￿rst order conditions of the household problem that maximizes utility (1) subject to the budget
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Each variety is produced by a monopolist. Prices are set as in Calvo (1983). Every period, a ￿rm is able to
revise the price with probability 1 ￿ ￿. The lottery that assigns rights to change prices is i:i:d: over time
and across ￿rms. Since there is a continuum of ￿rms, 1 ￿ ￿ is also the share of ￿rms that are able to revise




￿jQt;t+j [ptyt+j ￿ Wt+jnt+j]
where Qt;t+j is the nominal price at t of one unit of money at a particular state in period t + j, output







obtained from (8) and (7), where Yt+j = Ct+j + Gt+j.






































Using the demand functions (8), (7), it follows that










An equilibrium for fCt;Ntg, fpt;Pt;Wtg, and fit;￿c
t;￿n




























































In addition, an equilibrium condition is that the zero bound on nominal interest rates be veri￿ed so that
it ￿ 0:
Here $j is the share of ￿rms that have set prices j periods before, $j = (￿)j(1 ￿ ￿), j = 0;2;:::;t , and
$t+1 = (￿)t+1, which is the share of ￿rms that have never set prices so far. We assume that they all charge
an exogenous price p￿1.9
For now we abstract from the particular way in which monetary policy is conducted, whether it follows
a standard feedback rule, a target rule or a simple target for the sequence of nominal interest rates. In what
follows we characterize the e¢ cient allocation and the policy variables and prices that are consistent with it.
In Section 4, we explicitly consider an interest rate rule as well as ￿scal policy rules and discuss uniqueness
of equilibria.
9We do not need to keep track of the budget constraints, since lump sum taxes adjust to satisfy the budget.
73 E¢ cient allocations
The ￿rst best allocation is the one that maximizes utility (1) subject to the technology constraints (2), (3),
(4) and (5), above.
From (4) and (5), it follows that the marginal rate of transformation between any two varieties is equal






, it must be that an e¢ cient allocation satis￿es
cit = Ct, all i, t.
A similar argument applies to public consumption of the di⁄erent varieties, so that
git = Gt, all i, t.









Ct + Gt = AtNt: (20)
By comparing the e¢ ciency conditions with the equilibrium conditions we can describe the prices and
policy variables that are consistent with the e¢ cient allocation.
We now show that there are policies and prices that support the e¢ cient allocation, both away from and
at the zero bound. At the zero bound, those policies involve state and time varying taxes. We do this by
showing that there are policies and prices satisfying all the equilibrium conditions, above, for the e¢ cient
allocation, taking into account the zero bound constraint on the nominal interest rate.
3.1 Policy away from the zero bound.
In this section, we review how monetary policy can implement the e¢ cient allocation with constant taxes
on consumption ￿c and labor ￿n.
First, in order to achieve production e¢ ciency, conditions (8) and (7) imply that prices must be the same
across ￿rms
pt￿j
Pt = 1. That can only be the case if ￿rms start at time zero with a common price, p￿1,10 as we
assume, and if ￿rms that can subsequently change prices choose that common price, so that pt = Pt = p￿1.
This means that the price level must be constant across time and states. The reason is simple. Because
price setting decisions are staggered, in￿ ation necessarily comes at the cost of dispersion in relative prices.
This represents an economic distortion. Avoiding this distortion requires that in￿ ation be zero.
It therefore follows that the aggregate resource constraint (18) becomes (20). From Calvo￿ s price setting











10This is the standard assumption. Yun (2005) analyzes the case with initial price dispersion.
8This implies that






as under ￿ exible prices. Thus, the nominal wage must move with productivity so as to maintain the nominal
marginal cost constant.
From (15), with constant consumption taxes, we have






so the nominal interest rate must equal the natural rate of interest￿ the real interest rate that prevails at
the e¢ cient allocation.









implying that 1 ￿ ￿n = (1 + ￿c) ￿
￿￿1.
One possibility is to set consumption taxes to zero, ￿c = 0. Therefore labor must be subsidized at the
rate 1 ￿ ￿n = ￿
￿￿1. This labor subsidy is necessary to neutralize the mark up distortion. Note that the
subsidy is constant over time and states.







zero bound constraint is not binding and the e¢ cient allocation is implemented with constant taxes and
￿ exible monetary rate policy. In this model, in normal times, monetary policy achieves perfect economic
stabilization. We now look at the more interesting case where the natural rate of interest is negative.
3.2 Policy at the zero bound
We have seen that, in order to implement the e¢ cient allocation with constant taxes, the nominal interest
rate must equal the natural rate of interest, and prices must be constant. This implementation breaks down
when the natural rate of interest turns negative, because of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest
rate. With constant taxes, this failure is unavoidable and optimal monetary policy can only achieve a second
best allocation. We start by reviewing the policy trade-o⁄s confronting the design of monetary policy when
the zero lower bound is binding. We then move on to explain how ￿ exible taxes can be used to completely
circumvent the zero lower bound and implement the e¢ cient allocation.
One strategy is to then set the nominal interest rate to zero as long as the natural rate of interest is
negative, and to start raising the nominal interest rate again when the natural rate of interest turns positive.
This strategy results in de￿ ation and hence positive real interest rates when the zero bound is binding,
precisely when the natural rate of interest is negative. This de￿ ation comes together with a contraction in
output compared to the e¢ cient allocation.
With constant taxes, the only way to achieve a negative real interest rate is to generate in￿ ation. Because
price setting decisions are staggered, this necessarily generates dispersion in relative prices. This represents
9a real distortion and implies that the e¢ cient allocation cannot be implemented. These distortions have to
be weighted against the stimulation bene￿ts of lower real interest rates in the form of higher output and
consumption.
Recognizing this trade-o⁄leads to another strategy whose premise is to supplement zero nominal interest
rates with a commitment to keeping nominal interest rates below the natural rate of interest even when the
natural rate turns back positive. This commitment to stimulate the economy in the future raises demand
today through a wealth e⁄ect. Both higher present and future demand induces ￿rms to raise their prices. This
in turn generates in￿ ation, which lowers the real interest rate today and further stimulates the economy. In
fact, following Krugman (1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003 and 2004a) show that the optimal monetary
policy (with constant taxes) precisely follows this strategy. It is important to emphasize that this strategy
does not implement the e¢ cient allocation.
Instead if taxes are used, the e¢ cient allocation can be implemented at the zero bound. To see this,
we set the nominal interest rate to the natural rate of interest whenever the latter is positive, and to zero
















can be satis￿ed with the appropriate choice of consumption taxes over time. Similarly, the intratemporal





















and the ￿rst best is achieved.
As long as consumption and labor income taxes are ￿ exible instruments, the zero bound is not a constraint
to policy. Notice that the tax policies that implement the ￿rst best at the zero bound do not have to respond
to contemporaneus information. Consumption and labor income taxes can be predetermined.
The tax policy that implements the e¢ cient allocation does not involve net taxing or subsidizing. Notice
that the present value budget constraint of the households, can be written, replacing prices and taxes from
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0 is unrestricted by the implementation of the e¢ cient allocation whether at the zero bound,
or away from it. It is a lump sum tax on the initial nominal wealth of households. The present value of
10lump sum taxes is equal to the present value of government spending plus the value of initial liabilities. The
present value of the other taxes, used to implement the e¢ cient allocation, is zero. This is the case whether
the allocation is implemented with interest rates away from the zero bound, or with consumption and labor
income taxes. In this sense, tax policy that implements the e¢ cient allocation at the zero bound is revenue
neutral.
We now consider a special case of the model￿ the same considered by Eggertsson (2009) and Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009)￿ and describe optimal tax policy following a shock that lowers the natural
rate of interest to the point where the zero bound constraint would be binding. The discussion on alternative
policies in this context has focused on the role of government purchases.11 This is not without a, possibly
major, resource loss. Instead, the policy we characterize below deals with the zero bound constraint on
monetary policy at no cost.
3.3 Using ￿scal policy to avoid a recession
As in Eggertsson (2009) and Christiano et al. (2009) we consider speci￿c preferences as
u(Ct;Nt;￿t) = u(Ct;Nt)￿t (23)
In this way, the preference shock does not a⁄ect the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure. It will, however, a⁄ect the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at time t and
consumption at time t + 1. We also assume that Gt = G, At = 1, so that the only shock is the preference
shock.







Ct + G = Nt:
Therefore the e¢ cient allocation is constant, and is una⁄ected by the preference shock.
Let us consider a particular example, a deterministic version of the examples in Eggertsson (2009) and
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009). In their models, it is this shock - interacting with the zero
bound - that generates a potentially big recession.
Assume that ￿t evolves exogenously according to
￿t
￿t+1
< ￿ for t = 0;1;2;::;T ￿ 1;
￿t
￿t+1
= 1 for t = T;T + 1;T + 2;::
11Eggertsson also considers tax changes, but only one at a time. As we show, it is key to be able to change the two taxes -
consumption and labor income - jointly.
11The natural rate of interest is 1
￿
￿t
￿t+1 < 1 if t < T and 1
￿ > 1 for t ￿ T. We set the nominal interest rate
to 1 + it = 1 for t ￿ T ￿ 1 and 1 + it = ￿








; for t = 0;1;2;::;T ￿ 1:







= 1; for all t:
Note that, in this deterministic case, there is one degree of freedom in the choice of tax policy: the
initial level of the consumption tax ￿c
0. Given an initial consumption tax, the equations above completely
determine the paths of consumption and labor taxes. Consumption taxes increase over time for t < T and
then stabilize at some level ￿c for t ￿ T. Labor taxes follow the opposite pattern: they decrease over time





The key is that the prices that matter for intertemporal decisions are consumer prices, which are gross of
consumption taxes. The idea is to induce in￿ ation in consumer prices, while keeping producer price in￿ ation
at zero. The result is negative real interest rates, and the distortions associated with producer price in￿ ation
are altogether avoided. This can be achieved by a simultaneous adjustment in consumption and labor taxes.
A temporarily lower consumption tax (￿c
t < ￿c) generates in￿ ation in consumer prices. Why does the
labor tax need to be temporarily raised (￿n
t > ￿n)? The changes in consumption tax introduce undesirable
variations in the marginal cost of ￿rms: if the labor tax is kept unchanged at ￿n, the lower consumption
tax (￿c
t < ￿c) reduces the marginal cost of ￿rms. This also creates incentives for producers to reduce their
prices. This e⁄ect must therefore be counteracted by temporarily raising the labor tax (￿n
t > ￿n).
This policy resembles the sales tax holiday proposal by Hall and Woodward at the end of 2008 and
Feldstein in 2003 addressing the Japanese stagnation in the nineties. To implement the ￿rst best, however,
it is important to note that labor taxes must be adjusted in the opposite direction of consumption taxes so
as not to distort the intratemporal margin.
3.4 Time-consistency
Importantly, because our policy implements the e¢ cient allocation, it is time-consistent. If a future planner
were given an opportunity to revise this policy in the future, it would choose not to do so. This should be
contrasted with the policy recommendations involving future commitments to low interest rates in Krugman
(1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003 and 2004a). These policies involve commitments to "being
irresponsible" in the future by keeping the nominal interest rate below the natural rate of interest even when
the latter turns back positive. When the future comes, a planner is tempted to renege on these commitments
and raise interest rates as soon at the natural rate of interest turns positive.
This represents an additional advantage of ￿ exible tax policy. Not only does it deliver a better allocation
(the e¢ cient one), it also has the bene￿t of not requiring costly commitments that might be di¢ cult to make
credible.
124 The linearized model
In order to relate our results more closely to the literature, we now analyze the log-linearized version of the
model. As before, we assume At = 1, Gt = G, and u(Ct;Nt;￿t) = u(Ct;Nt)￿t.
Then, the following equations provide a log linear approximation12 to the model above:
b yt = Etb yt+1 ￿ ￿(^ {t ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ rt) + ￿(Etb ￿
c
t+1 ￿ b ￿
c
t); (24)
￿t = ￿b yt + ￿  (b ￿
n
t + b ￿
c
t) + ￿Et￿t+1; (25)
where ￿t = ln Pt
Pt￿1, ^ {t = ln (1 + it), b yt = ln Yt












(1￿￿n), and rt = ln￿
￿1 + ln￿t ￿
Et ln￿t+1. Note that it and rt are in levels, while the other variables are in deviations to the steady state.
That is only for the convenience of de￿ning the lower bound. The steady state has zero in￿ ation, zero growth
rate of taxes, and the nominal interest rate equal to the real, ^ { = r = ln￿
￿1.
We now assume that monetary policy follows an interest rate rule that explicitly takes into account the
lower bound on nominal interest rates
^ {t = maxf0;rt + ￿￿￿t + ￿yb ytg. (26)
In this linear version of the model, if the parameters of the interest rate rule satisfy the Taylor principle,
then given the tax policy, the interest rate rule implements a unique local solution to the linear system.
Consider the case where ￿scal policy is not used, b ￿
c
t = 0 and b ￿
n
t = 0. As long as the lower bound does not
bind, movements in the nominal interest rate can fully o⁄set the preference shock a⁄ecting rt. Indeed, the
interest rate rule is de￿ned so as to fully insulate output and in￿ ation from this shock, so that in equilibrium,
b yt = 0, and ￿t = 0. The intuition is simple: shocks to the real interest rate should be absorbed one to one
by changes in the nominal interest rate. In this way, the shock does not a⁄ect prices and therefore there is
no change in output.
Note, on the other hand, that if the nominal interest rate is zero and there is a large enough negative
shock to the real interest rate such that rt < 0, this could result in de￿ ation and, given the price frictions,
output would drop. This is why the zero bound on interest rates can be a cost to policy.
Fiscal policy can also be used to respond to the shock, and fully stabilize the economy. Suppose the
outcome of the interest rate rule is that the nominal interest rate is zero, ^ {t = 0. From (24), it is clear that
there will be a conditional growth rate of the consumption tax,
Etb ￿
c
t+1 ￿ b ￿
c
t = rt,
that will satisfy the ￿rst equation for b yt = Etb yt+1 = 0 and Et￿t+1 = 0. From (25), there is an adjustment
on the labor income tax,
b ￿
n
t = ￿b ￿
c
t,
that will satisfy the second equation for b yt = 0 and ￿t = Et￿t+1 = 0. The interest rate rule (26) is satis￿ed.
12See the Appendix for the derivation of the linear approximation. The linear equations are similar to Eggertsson (2009).
135 A Model with Capital
The model can easily be extended to allow for capital accumulation. However, to achieve the ￿rst best, the
tax policy must be enriched to include a tax on income from capital. To do so, assume that investment, It,











Aggregate investment increases the capital stock according to
Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt + It. (28)





















t￿1;t + UtKt + (1 ￿ ￿)PtKt ￿
￿k
t (UtKt ￿ ￿PtKt) + (1 ￿ ￿n
t )WtNt ￿ (1 + ￿c
t)PtCt ￿ Tt
Ut is the rental cost of capital. Note that the tax ￿k
t has an allowance for depreciation. We believe this is the
most natural assumption. As we will show, it will have implications on the behavior of this tax rate when
implementing the optimal allocation.













, t ￿ 0 (31)
The production function of each good i, yit, uses labor, nit, and capital and is given by
yit = AtF (kit;nit);
where At is an aggregate productivity shock and the production function is constant returns to scale.














Let the corresponding cost function be Ct = C (yit;Ut;Wt). This is linear in yit, so that marginal cost is a
function of the aggregates only.








where Cy (:) is marginal cost, and ￿t;j are the same as in the model without capital.
Market clearing for each variety implies that
cit + git + iit = AtF (nit;kit) (32)





Using the demand functions (8), (7), it follows that13













































































As before, we do not need to keep track of the budget constraints, since lump sum taxes adjust to satisfy
the budget.
E¢ cient allocations As before, at the e¢ cient allocation, the marginal rate of technical substitution
between any two varieties must be equal to one, so
cit = Ct ; git = Gt ; iit = It:
































[At+1Fk (Kt+1;Nt+1) + 1 ￿ ￿] (40)
and
Ct + Gt + Kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Kt = AtF (Kt;Nt): (41)
Policy variables and prices with variable interest rates We ￿rst set ￿c
t = 0. As before, so as to
achieve production e¢ ciency, the price level must be constant across time and states. The aggregate resource





so that nominal marginal cost must be constant. Since Cy (Ut;Wt) = Ut
AtFk = Wt


















￿ so the labor income tax will have to be 1 ￿ ￿n
t = ￿
￿￿1. The nominal wage will be









and the nominal interest rate must move with the real rate to satisfy







The rental cost of capital satis￿es (35). Finally, the tax rate on capital income must be chosen to satisfy the
marginal condition for capital (37).















At+1Fk (Kt+1;Nt+1) ￿ ￿
￿￿￿
:
Clearly the capital income tax must be moving with shocks in order to implement the e¢ cient allocation.
It is no longer the case that the e¢ cient allocation can be implemented with constant taxes.14
It is interesting to note, though, that this is the case because we assume, as is standard, that ￿rms can
deduct depreciation expenses from the capital income tax, i.e., the tax is paid on (Ut ￿ ￿Pt)Kt. If, instead,
























￿ = 1, would be consistent with the optimal allocation.
14Standard New Keynesian models usually have labor only and assume taxes are not ￿exible. If instead they considered
capital, the non￿exiblity of taxes would be costly.
16Policy variables and prices at the zero bound When the natural rate of interest is negative, the
e¢ cient allocation can no longer be implemented with constant consumption and labor taxes. But it can
still be implemented with ￿ exible taxes.
As before, we set the nominal interest equal to the natural rate of interest whenever the latter is positive,















which imposes restrictions on the path of consumption taxes. There are multiple paths that satisfy these
constraints. The labor income tax will have to move to compensate for the movements in the consumption
tax, satisfying condition (42) above.























At+1Fk (Kt+1;Nt+1) ￿ ￿
￿￿)
:
Going back to the experiment of Section 3:3, when the zero bound is temporarily binding, we must
now supplement consumption and labor taxes with capital taxes. The reason is simple. When capital is
introduced in the model, the increasing path of consumption taxes, that is necessary to circumvent the zero
bound constraint, acts as an undesirable tax on capital. Its e⁄ects on capital accumulation must therefore
be counteracted with an o⁄setting capital subsidy. This subsidy must remain in place as long as the natural
rate of interest is negative (until period T).
6 The irrelevance of the zero bound in more general environments
We have shown that tax policy can be used to achieve full e¢ ciency, when nominal interest rates are at the
zero bound. In order for this to be the case, it must be that there are no idiosyncratic shocks, that the
initial distribution of prices across ￿rms is degenerate, that pro￿t taxes are used to ￿nance the subsidies to
production, and that lump sum taxes are used to ￿nance government spending. We ￿nd the extreme case
to be particularly illustrative of the point we want to make, but the result is more general. In these cashless
economies with sticky prices, whatever policy can do with the nominal rate, can also be done with tax policy.
But tax policy can do more: The zero bound constraint can be made irrelevant. This is the case, regardless
of whether full e¢ ciency can be attained. We now make this explicit.
We modify the model in Section 2 and allow for productivity shocks to be idiosyncratic. The production
function of each good i, now, uses labor, nit; according to
cit + git = yit+j = AtAitnit; (43)
15Note that, contrary to the case with a ￿exible interest rate and no consumption taxes, in this case a ￿exible capital income
tax rate is necessary even if the tax base is the gross capital income.
17where At is an aggregate shock and Ait is an uncorrelated ￿rm speci￿c productivity shock.
Let ￿it 2 f0;1g be the random variable, such that, if ￿it = 1, the ￿rm can change the price. The draws
are i:i:d: over time and across ￿rms with Et￿1 [Ait] = 1. The ￿rms that are able to change prices choose the
price p￿














obtained from (8) and (7), where Yt+j = Ct+j + Gt+j.



























The price of ￿rm i is pit = p￿
it if ￿it = 1, and pit = pit￿1, otherwise.
6.1 Equilibria
Using the demand functions (8), (7), it follows that














An equilibrium for fCt;Ntg, fpit;p￿
it;Pt;Wtg, and fit;￿c
t;￿n
t g is characterized by households marginal con-
ditions (14), (15) with Rt ￿ 1, the price setting constraint (44), above, the condition for the price level (6),
where pit = p￿
it if ￿it = 1, and pit = pit￿1, otherwise, and the resource constraints (45).
If, at time zero, ￿rm i cannot optimally choose the price, because ￿i0 = 0, then pi0 = pi;￿1, and there is
a distribution of these initial prices which is not necessarily degenerate.
6.2 The e¢ cient ￿ exible price allocation























18and the resource constraints would be


























This condition and the resource constraints (46) are the only implementability conditions. The e¢ cient







￿￿1 = 1 (taxes are required to counteract the monopoly distortion).
One possibility is to set ￿c
t = 0 and 1
1￿￿n = ￿￿1
￿ :
6.3 Implementability with interest rate policy only
We now turn to the sticky price economy. In this section, we restrict the consumption tax and the labor tax
to be constant ￿c
t = ￿c, ￿n































j UC(t + j)(Pt+j)
￿￿1 Yt+j
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where pit = p￿
it if ￿it = 1, and pit = pit￿1, if ￿it = 0;
uC (Ct;Nt;￿t)
Pt




















and the zero bound constraint it ￿ 0.
There are two reasons why the ￿ exible price allocation might not be implemented: the zero bound on
nominal interest rates and the presence of idiosyncratic shocks. The ￿rst reason is by now familiar. The
second reason is new. With idiosyncratic shocks, at the e¢ cient allocation, the relative price for any two





prices, it is impossible to replicate this volatile pattern of relative prices.
196.4 Implementability with both interest rates and tax policy
With ￿ exible tax rates, an equilibrium for fpit;p￿
it;Pt;￿c
t;￿n































together with (48), where pit = p￿

















(50); and ￿nally the restriction that the zero bound constraint be veri￿ed it ￿ 0.































Note that the weight ￿t;0 depends on the path for the consumption taxes.
When ￿ exible taxes can be used, the zero bound constraint does not restrict the set of implementable
allocations and prices. To see this, consider a sequence for prices and allocations fpit;p￿
it;Pt;Ct;Nt;Ytg that
satis￿es (51), (48), (52), and (50), but does not necessarily satisfy the zero bound constraint. We denote
by f￿c
t;￿n
t ;itg the corresponding sequence of taxes and nominal interest rates, and we denote by ￿t;0 the
quantity de￿ned in equation (54) for this allocation.




t ;~ {tg for
taxes, in such a way that the zero bound constraint is satis￿ed. We now explain how to construct consumption
and labor taxes that implement the original allocation with the new interest rate ~ {t = maxfit;0g. The key
is to construct consumption taxes in such a way that (52) holds and the weights are unchanged, ~ ￿t;0 = ￿t;0.
In order to perform this construction recursively, it is useful to represent the realization of uncertainty
as a tree. Consider a history (a node in the tree) and assume that ~ ￿
c
t has been chosen. We construct ~ ￿
c
t+1
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20This can be seen as a system of two equations in the unknowns ~ ￿
c
t+1. This system always has a solution








is not constant across the possible continuation histories, or in other words that this date-t + 1 random
variable is not predictable at time t. We then set labor taxes as follows
1 ￿ ~ ￿
n
t









We have proved the following result: modulo a technical condition, every allocation that can be imple-
mented with a combination of taxes and monetary policy that does not necessarily respect the zero lower
bound constraint can also be implemented with a di⁄erent combination of taxes and monetary policy that
does respect the zero lower bound constraint. Our proof can easily be adapted to show the stronger results
that the interest rate is a redundant instrument when ￿ exible taxes can be used. While the nominal interest
rate is a redundant policy instrument when taxes are also used for stabilization, taxes are not redundant
instruments. For example, if taxes are not used, then the set of implementable allocations will be restricted
by the zero bound on nominal interest rates.
It is important to emphasize that even with ￿ exible taxes, the e¢ cient allocation cannot be implemented.
This would require a richer set of instruments, i. e. consumption and labor taxes speci￿c to each ￿rm in the
economy.
7 Conclusions
The main conclusion of this paper is that in the standard New-Keynesian model, the zero bound constraint
on nominal interest rates is not a relevant restriction on policy when both ￿scal and monetary policy are
￿ exible. In response to a recent literature on using ine¢ cient monetary or government spending policies to
circumvent the zero bound constraint in the New-Keynesian model, we show that tax policy can do that at
zero cost.
The argument that ￿scal policy can neutralize the e⁄ects of the zero bound is very simple. Suppose the
objective of policy was to lower real rates. If nominal rates cannot be lowered, real rates can still be low
if expected in￿ ation is high. Getting all prices to move together in response to aggregate conditions￿ so
expected in￿ ation is high￿ may come at a cost. Note that the relevant in￿ ation to consider is producer price
in￿ ation. Indeed, it may be costly to get all producers in the economy to raise all future prices uniformly.
But in￿ ation arising from a reduction in current consumption taxes (or increases in future consumption
taxes) is easy to achieve, can be announced and implemented at zero cost, and brings down real interest
rates.
Movements in consumption taxes would in general distort other margins. For this reason we have to
use a model where those decisions are explicitly modelled, and allow for other taxes as well. In a standard
new-Keynesian model, we show that, if consumption and labor income taxes are both used, it is possible
21to compensate for the distortions and achieve the ￿rst best. We then analyze the same economy but with
capital accumulation. The main results extend to this case, as long as ￿ exible capital income taxes are also
used. Importantly, because our policy implements the e¢ cient allocation, it is time-consistent: if a future
planner were given an opportunity to revise this policy in the future, it would choose not to do so.
We ￿rst consider an environment where the ￿rst best can be implemented, even at the zero bound.
This assumption makes the results particularly stark, but the irrelevance of the zero bound constraint
holds more generally. We consider an extension of the model where the full e¢ cient allocation cannot be
achieved, because of idiosyncratic shocks or because the initial distribution of prices of the di⁄erent ￿rms is
not degenerate. Productive e¢ ciency can no longer be achieved, but tax policy can undo the zero bound
restriction on nominal interest rates.
In order for the zero bound to be ine⁄ective, taxes must be ￿ exible. But, are taxes ￿ exible enough?
After witnessing the policy response to the recent crisis in the US and elsewhere, it is hard to argue for lack
of ￿ exibility of any ￿scal policy. In any case, our point is also normative, meaning that if taxes were not
￿ exible, they should be made ￿ exible. There are also many examples of movements in sectorial or state level
taxes with the purpose of stimulating spending. Interesting examples are the tax holidays on sales taxes in
many states in the US,16 and programs such as the Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save (CARS) set
up in June 2009.17
We have analyzed these questions in a model with sticky prices but ￿ exible wages. It should be clear
that our policies can be adapted to an economy with sticky wages, provided that the employer and employee
components of the payroll tax can be adjusted separately.
We have analyzed the implications of a particular restriction on the nominal interest rate, that it cannot
be negative. But for the economy of a small state in a federation or a small economy in a monetary union,
the nominal interest rate is always beyond control. The implications for stabilization policy are similar to
the ones we have seen in this paper, applied to an apparently very di⁄erent issue. If interest rate policy
cannot be adjusted, tax policy can still be, and the constraints on the nominal rate can be made irrelevant.
Common nominal interest rates do not have to be too low or too high.
In the economy we have analyzed, we do not consider good speci￿c taxes. And concluded that ￿scal
policy at the zero bound can do as well as monetary policy away from the zero bound. In an environment
where di⁄erent sectors are hit by di⁄erent shocks, or a⁄ected di⁄erently by common shocks, ￿scal policy that
treats di⁄erent sectors di⁄erently can do better than monetary policy, whether at the zero bound or away
from it.
16It is customary for many states in the US to announce yearly sales tax holidays for speci￿c sets of goods. They typically
last for only a few days.
17Commonly known as Cash for Clunkers, this was a temporary subsidy for the trading in and purchase of a new, more fuel
e¢ cient, vehicle. The initial budget was set to one billion dollars and planned to last for ￿ve months. Due to the high number
of applications, it was terminated after the second month, and the ￿nal budget was close to three billion.
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248 Appendix: The log-linearized model













The steady state has
Ct = C, Nt = N, ￿t = 1;￿c
t = ￿c;￿n
t = ￿n
Pt = pt = P;1 + i = ￿
￿1
so that





If we log-linearize equation (15); using (18) to replace labor, we obtain
￿b Ct + ￿b ￿t ￿ b ￿
c
t ’ ^ {t ￿ ln￿














= 1 if ￿t is multiplicative
b Ct = ln
Ct
C










^ {t = ln(1 + it)
Linearization of the aggregate resource constraint yields














assuming that government consumption is constant, delivers
C
C + G
b Ct = b yt
So, if we let g￿1 = C
C+G, then
b Ct = gb yt;
If we also assume that the shock ￿t is multiplicative, so ￿ = 1; we can write equation (57) as
￿gb yt +b ￿t ￿ b ￿
c
t ’ ^ {t ￿ ln￿
￿1 ￿ Et￿t+1 + ￿gEtb yt+1 + Etb ￿t+1 ￿ Etb ￿
c
t+1
25or, letting ￿ = 1=￿g;
b yt ’ Etb yt+1 + ￿
h
^ {t ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿
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= u(Ct+j;Nt+j)￿t+j; then ￿ = 0: Note also that ￿ > 0:
Thus, we can write
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= ￿t+1 + ￿t+1(j ￿ 1)
26so we can write the equation as
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But the log linearization of (17) delivers
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￿1
we obtain
￿t ’ ￿  (b ￿
c
t + b ￿
n
t ) + ￿b yt ￿ ￿ ￿b ￿t + ￿Et￿t+1
We assume that the shock ￿t is multiplicative, so ￿ = 0. If we let rt =
￿
ln￿
￿1 +b ￿t ￿ Etb ￿t+1
￿
; the system
can be written as
￿t ’ ￿b yt + ￿  (b ￿
n
t + b ￿
c
t) + ￿Et￿t+1
b yt ’ Etb yt+1 ￿ ￿(^ {t ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ rt) + ￿(Etb ￿
c
t+1 ￿ b ￿
c
t)
with the constraint that ^ {t ￿ 0.
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